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The purpose of this essay is to rethink the meaning of 
modernity through an examination of Maruyama’s defense 
of modernity during the “Overcoming of Modernity” Debate 
in Japan in 1942. I will initially propose that Maruyama 
understood the opponents of modernity as ultra-nationalists 
who were merely defending an ideological justification for 
Japan’s war. However, Maruyama defined “modern 
thinking” (kindaiteki shii) in terms of personal autonomy.  
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His understanding of modernity as a mental attitude led to 
his failure to consider the technological aspect of this debate. 
After considering the various intellectual positions on this 
issue, I shall argue that a democratic control of technology 
must be presupposed in Maruyama’s defense of modernity. 
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aruyama Masao (1914-1996), the most influential 
political thinker in post-war Japan, tried to defend 
modernity against the criticisms of  the participants of  the 
so-called “Overcoming Modernity” symposium in 1942. It 
was held immediately after the outbreak of  the Pacific War 
under the auspices of  the literary magazine “Bungakukai” 
(Literary World).  
In general, this symposium was thought to be an 
attempt by the ultra-nationalists to ideologically justify 
Japan’s war. Many studies on the symposium, however, 
have shown that the advocates of  “Overcoming 
Modernity” had real and serious concerns with the 
phenomenon of  modernity, and did not merely promote 
ultra-nationalist goals. In light of  this more nuanced  
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understanding of  the symposium, how then should we 
understand Maruyama’s defense of  modernity?  
My first step in answering this question is to approach it 
from the perspective of  technology, that is to say, I will 
show how technology was an essential component of  the 
debate about modernity in the symposium. My thesis is that 
Maruyama had a persuasive point of  view regarding the 
phenomenon of  modernity, but he overlooked the 
importance of  the technological aspects of  modernity that 
the advocates of  “Overcoming Modernity” knew had to be 
dealt with in the real world. This is because he reduced the 
question of  modernity to that of  “modern thinking” 
(kindaiteki shii).  
1. Maruyama’s Reaction to the “Overcoming Modernity” 
Debate 
1.1  Modernity for Maruyama Maruyama believed that 
“modern thinking” (kindaiteki shii) was never acquired 
in Japan. For him, this way of  thinking was 
constituted by autonomous individuals who can 
change and re-invent society according to their own 
will and judgment. Maruyama tried to promote this 
notion of  “personal autonomy” (to put it in the  
vocabulary of  Rikki Kersten)2 as the prerequisite of  
modern democracy in post-war Japan.  
 
2 See Rikki Kersten, Democracy in Postwar Japan: Maruyama Masao and the 
search for autonomy (London: Routledge, 1996).  




Maruyama thought that one of  the problems of  
Japanese society was the absence of  autonomy. In the 
“Theory and Psychology of  Ultra-Nationalism” 
(1946), he characterized the political structure of  pre-
war Japan as the “interfusion of  ethics and power.”3 
According to Maruyama, modern European 
governments take a neutral attitude towards the 
individual’s moral and religious values, such as truth 
or justice. In accordance with this attitude, the 
systems of  laws are formed on the basis of  formal 
validity claims that can be redeemed regardless of  the 
values held by individual persons. In other words, 
modern states do not intervene in one’s internal and 
private sphere. This separation between the public 
and the private spheres is an important characteristic 
of  modern states.  
Japan, however, overlooked the importance of  this 
separation and attempted to establish the unbroken 
Imperial line as the absolute substance of  the 
people’s sense of  values. As a result, the people 
exercised their judgments not according to their own 
conscience but in relation to those who are in power.  




3  Maruyama Masao, Thought and Behavior in Modern Japanese Politics, 
expanded edition, ed. Ivan Morris, (London: Oxford University Press, 1969),9. 




were right or wrong. Instead, they decide according to  
the “degree of  proximity to the ultimate value or 
entity.”4  
Maruyama argues that even the Emperor himself  
was not an exception. For he was also inescapably 
bound by the ancestral tradition. He observed that 
“[t]hough the Emperor was regarded as the 
embodiment of  ultimate value, he was infinitely 
removed from the possibility of  creating values out of  
nothingness.”5 Thus, in pre-war Japan, no one lived as 
an autonomous and responsible individual. In his later 
essay, he called this structure the “system of  
irresponsibilities.”6 
For those who are aware of  Michel Foucault’s 
criticism towards the notion of  subjectivity, 
Maruyama’s argument could raise some controversies.  
From the standpoint of  Foucault, European modern 
states have never been “neutral” because the notion 
of  autonomy is always constituted in relation to power 
structures.  
The Panopticon, conceived by Jeremy Bentham, was 
cited by Foucault as an example of  the domination of  
social structures.7  It was a prison where a guard can 
 
4 Ibid., 12. 
5 Ibid., 20. 
6 Ibid., 128 
7 See Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. 
Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage Books, 1995), 195-228. 




keep watch on all inmates; each inmate cannot see the 
guard and does not know when he or she is being 
watched or not. Therefore, the only strategy that the 
inmates can employ is to always behave in accordance 
with the norm or rule of  the prison even while they 
are not watched. Thus, they internalized the norm and 
controlled themselves. According to Foucault, this so-
called autonomy comes from a form of  self-control. 
The subject cannot be independent of  power relations 
and cannot be purely rational. In this sense, we might 
be able to say that Foucault declared the death of  the 
subject.  
Therein lies the similarity between Foucault and 
Maruyama. Maruyama also thought that people 
internalized the values and norms embodied in the 
Emperor’s social system because their way of  
thinking and behavior were constituted in relation to 
the power structures within the system. Nevertheless, 
Maruyama did not declare the death of  the subject as 
Foucault did. On the contrary, he cried out for the 
establishment of  the modern autonomous subject.  
In this light, we can say that he tried to create a 
“modernity” that existed nowhere in Japan. 
However, this “nowhere” character comes from 
the ideality of  Maruyama’s notion of  modernity. As 
Kersten points out, the word “modernity” has been  
 




caught in a tangle of  dichotomies such as “tradition 
versus modernity, East versus West, internally 
generated versus externally generated change, and 
modern versus feudal.”8 Maruyama has often been 
criticized for his Western-centered attitude because 
he often denounced Japanese traditions by the 
standards of  Western culture. However, he was not a 
mere occidentalist. Kersten argues that “[i]n order to 
avoid such a clash, modernization had to transcend 
its Western image. Maruyama resolved this in part by 
associating the modern with the universal.” 9  This 
universalization inevitably accompanies the idealization 
of  modernity. In other words, universalization 
sublimates modernity into an ideal which has not yet 
been realized anywhere, but which we should make 
infinite efforts to realize. In this sense, Maruyama’s 
approach may be similar to that of  Habermas, who 
regards modernity as an “unfinished project.” 
To get straight to the point, Maruyama thought 
the ideal of  modernity lies in democracy, not as a  
static institution, but as a dynamic process. For 
example, Maruyama says in one of  his diaries: 
It does not make any sense to talk about an 
eternal revolution concerning socialism. It 
 
8 Kersten, Democracy in Postwar Japan, 109. 
9 Ibid., 109. 




is concerning democracy that it makes  
sense. For, democracy is a concept which 
contains a paradox, namely the rule by the 
people―the rule by a majority. Precisely 
because it is unnatural that a majority rules 
and a minority is ruled (Rousseau), 
democracy is realistic not as an institution 
but as a process, as an eternal movement.10 
What he is saying here is probably the following: 
the rule by a small group of  people is a natural form 
of  government. For example, a minority such as 
kings, aristocrats, etc., governed a majority of  the 
people in pre-modern states. Democracy is not an 
exception either, even though representatives are 
elected by means of  voting. If  the rule by a minority 
is a natural form of  government, it follows that there 
is always a danger that democracy will be immobilized 
and fall into its natural state of  oligarchy. Therefore, 
in order to maintain democracy as the rule  
of  the majority, we must constantly resist against this 
natural tendency of  government. The “modern 




10  Maruyama Masao, Jikonai Taiwa: sansatsu no nōto kara [The Inner 
Dialogues with Myself: From three notebooks] (Tokyo: Misuzu shobō, 1998), 56. 




nothing more than an illusion. However, from the  
standpoint of  Maruyama, it is a necessary illusion in  
order to animate democracy as an “eternal revolution.” 
Modernization requires the acquisition of  this 
illusion.  
1.2 Maruyama’s Understanding of  the “Overcoming Modernity” 
Debate – As mentioned earlier, the “Overcoming 
Modernity” debate was often regarded as an ultra-
nationalist attempt at an ideological justification for 
Japan’s war. For example, Kawakami Tetsutarō, the 
chairman of  the “Overcoming Modernity” symposium, 
expressed the objective of  the symposium in the 
following way: 
I’m not sure whether this symposium was a 
success or not. However, there is no 
disguising the fact that this was made with 
the intellectual shudder which we have felt 
one year after the opening of  the war. It is 
true that we, intellectuals, personally feel 
uneasy because of  the conflict between our 
Japanese blood, on the one hand, which has 
worked as a true driving force behind our 
intellectual activities, and the Western 
knowledge, which has systematized them 
awkwardly on the other. This is the reason 




for the chaos and breakdown which 
prevailed during the entire symposium.11  
What caused the conflict between “Japanese blood” 
and “Western knowledge” is the anti-Western 
character of  the Pacific War. This may be easier to 
understand if  we contrast it with the second Sino-
Japanese war. Many Japanese people naively believed 
or hoped, with a vague sense of  guilt, that the second 
Sino-Japanese war was, or would be, a war that aims 
to liberate Asian countries from the influence of  the 
Western World. In this sense, Western countries are 
not really direct enemies. However, in the case of  the 
Pacific War, the United States of  America suddenly 
emerged as a direct enemy. This is meaningful 
because it is generally believed that it was the USA 
that first brought modern civilization to Japan.  
Since the Meiji Restoration in 1868, Japan had 
received “modernity” from the West. Though there 
were strong objections to the acceptance of  this 
foreign culture, Japanese people managed to accept it 
by separating internal “spirit” from external 
“techniques,” as seen in the expression “Japanese 
spirit with Western techniques” (wakon-yōsai). The 
Japanese people, however, failed to keep the purity 
 
11 Kawakami Tetsutarō, Takeuchi Yoshimi, et al., Kindai no chōkoku 
[Overcoming Modernity], (Tokyo: Toyama-bō,1979), 166. 




of  the “Japanese spirit.” The more the society was 
modernized, the more inseparable it became from 
“Western techniques.” Therefore, when the Pacific 
War broke out, Japanese intellectuals were forced to 
realize how their spirit had been permeated by 
Western modernity. But this was considered to be the 
enemy’s culture that has to be sublated and they 
believed that they had to purify the Japanese spirit 
from modernity again. This is how this symposium 
was popularly understood as initiated by the outbreak 
of  the Pacific War in December 1941.  
Maruyama’s understanding of  the symposium is 
basically the same. For example, in the introduction 
to the English edition of  Studies in the Intellectual 
History of  Tokugawa Japan (Nihon Seiji Shisōshi Kenkyū, 
hereafter Studies), he questions the standpoint of  
the “Overcoming Modernity” debate.12 He asked two 
questions: (1) whether it is true that Japan was 
modernized enough to be able to problematize the 
question of  “overcoming modernity” and (2) whether 
it is justifiable from a historical perspective that 
modernity was indeed alien to the pure “Japanese  
spirit” that had purportedly existed before the influx 
of  Western civilization. His answers to these  
 
 
12 See Maruyama Masao, Studies in the Intellectual History of Tokugawa Japan, 
trans. Mikiso Hane (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1974), xxx-xxxii. 




questions are negative: Japan was not so modernized 
as the “Overcoming Modernity” advocates thought it 
was and modernity was not alien to the “Japanese 
spirit” even before the Meiji period.  
Chronologically, each chapter of  the Studies was 
published as an independent essay in the 1940’s and it 
came out as a book in 1952. The English edition was 
released in 1974. Maruyama discussed in the later 
edition what happened about 30 years before. 
However, the following statement shows that his 
basic point of  view has not changed. Right after 
Japan’s defeat, he argues:  
Now it is obvious to anyone that far from 
being “overcome,” modern thinking (kindaiteki 
shii) has never been acquired in its truest sense 
in this country. Therefore, we can say for the 
time being that it is not so necessary as it was 
before to explain, in the first place, this basic 
proposition over and over again; especially in 
a study about the modern intellectual history 
of  our country. On the other hand, however, 
we cannot justifiably say that there was no 
spontaneous growth of  modern ideas in 
Japan. The present depressing and pitiful  
situation is the best opportunity, so to speak, 
for the “nothing-to-do-with” (muen) theory  
 




as opposed to the “overcome” (chōkoku) 
theory. However, it conceals in itself  a 
danger that it will deprive people of  their 
confidence in their ability to think for 
themselves and, as a result, cause them to 
return to the erstwhile concept of  equating 
modern ideas with western ideas 
In this sense, I think that the intellectual history of  
the Tokugawa period, not to mention the Meiji 
period, deserves more attention in order to elucidate 
the modernization of  Japanese ideas.13  
Maruyama’s defense of  modernity consists of  two 
strategies: to demonstrate that (1) Japan was not so 
modernized to the extent that “overcoming modernity” 
could not be such an urgent problem and that (2) 
modernity was not foreign to Japan even during the 
Tokugawa period. As for strategy (1), whether Japan 
was modernized or not depends on the meaning of  
modernity. For example, if  we regard modernity as the 
equivalent of  industrialization, we can say that pre-war 
Japan was modernized to some extent. However, it is  
obvious that Maruyama did not take this direction.  
Then, how did he define modernity? I discussed this  
question in section 1.2 and argued that he regarded 
 
13 Maruyama Masao, Senchū to sengo no aida [Between the War and Postwar] 
(Tokyo: Misuzu shobō, 1976), 189. 




modernization as the acquisition of  “modern thinking” 
based on personal autonomy, which he thought was a 
prerequisite for the universal ideal of  democracy. 
Strategy (2) is closely connected with his definition of  
modernity because his ultimate purpose was to show 
that Japan was not removed from the universal ideal 
of  modernity in essence. To believe in the purity of  the 
“Japanese spirit” is to believe that it is essentially 
impossible for it to be modernized. This way of  thinking 
would close the door to genuine modernization. 
Therefore, Maruyama had to demonstrate that there was 
a birth of  “modern thinking” even before the Meiji 
period. From his perspective, the problem is that its 
growth has always been hampered in Japan.  
1.3 Nature and Invention – According to Maruyama, 
modern thinking first emerged in OGYŪ Sorai (1666-
1728), a Zhu Xi neo-Confucian thinker in the 
middle Tokugawa period. Traditional Zhu Xi neo-
Confucianism had a strong tendency to see the 
existing social system as a given by the natural 
order. Its theory functioned not as a “revolutionary 
principle directed against the concrete social order”14 
but as an “ideology guaranteeing the permanence of  
the existing social order.”15  
 
 
14 Maruyama Masao, Studies, 199. 
15 Ibid., 199. 




This ideology was useful in the justification of  the 
reign of  the Tokugawa Shogunate, at least in the early 
period. In the middle Tokugawa period, however, 
Sorai’s idea of  “autonomous personality” (shutaiteki 
jinkaku)16 appeared. The feudal social order then was 
becoming less and less stable. Accordingly, Sorai, as 
an adviser of  the eighth Tokugawa Shogun, 
attempted to restore it through a re-invention of  the 
Shogun. Sorai regarded the existing social order not 
as a given by the natural order, but as invented ex-
nihilo by the legendary Chinese sages, and by analogy 
with them, the real rulers such as Shoguns. The sages 
are the very “producers of  order out of  absolute 
disorder”17 and “[b]efore the sages’ invention there 
was nothing [normative]; after it, everything.”18 Thus, 
Sorai believed that the social system was invented by 
autonomous personalities.  
Observing the intellectual history of  modern 
Europe, Maruyama argues that Sorai’s idea of  
autonomous personality marked the emergence of   
modern thinking in Japan. In the transition period 
from the Middle Ages to the early modern period, 
Maruyama claimed the emergence of  the “discovery 
of  man.” 
 
16 Ibid., 207 
17 Ibid., 212. 
18 Ibid., 212. 




The discovery of  man does not mean 
recognizing the existence of  man as an object, 
but that man began to be conscious of  his 
autonomy. Until then, man had fatalistically 
accepted the various social systems into 
which he had to fit. But now he found 
himself  in a position to establish or abolish 
these systems freely according to his own will 
and ideas.19 
In this regard, Maruyama thinks that the social 
contract theory is a full-fledged form of  the theory of  
invention because “the theory that men as agents with 
free will invent the social order applies to every 
individual.”20 In this light, Sorai’s idea is not completely 
modern in that only the legendary sages and the real 
rulers such as Shoguns had autonomy. Nevertheless, 
Sorai’s theory of  autonomous personality witnessed the 
birth of  modern thinking in Japan in that it discovered 
autonomy in human beings.  
However, the problem is that the lingering effects 
of  the notion of  “nature” have always hampered the 
growth of  the ideas of  “invention.” For example, 
Andō Shōeki, an anti-Confucian social philosopher,  
 
 
19 Ibid., 226. 
20 Ibid., 231. 




situated the concept of  nature as the ideal agriculture-
based society prior to the emergence of  what Sorai 
called the “sages’ invention.” Engaging in agriculture, 
Shōeki lived together with peasants and witnessed the 
harsh reality of  the feudal society, in which the warrior 
class exploited peasants and collected the heavy land 
tax without cultivating the soil. Shōeki attributed this 
unfairness to the sages’ invention of  the feudal social 
order. Thus, he claimed that Japanese society should 
return to the agriculture-based natural society prior to 
the sage’s invention. However, because of  his denial of  
invention, Maruyama argues that Shōeki could not 
show the way towards realizing such an ideal society. 
According to Shōeki’s logic, we can only wait for it to 
come, but not invent it. 
MOTOORI Norinaga, a theorist of  National 
Learning (kokugaku), strongly criticized Sorai’s 
version of  neo-Confucianism. In traditional neo-
Confucianism, the principle of  nature was supposed 
to be embodied in the social norms and thereby 
governed human life―not only external behaviors 
but also inner sentiments―from inside. However, in 
Sorai’s theory of  invention, the social norms were cut  
off  from nature because Sorai based the norms on 
the sages’ invention. As a result, it followed that all 
people have to do is to adjust their external behavior 
to fit external norms regardless of  what they may feel  
 




inside. Thus, Sorai’s idea separated the human inner 
realm from the sociopolitical realm.  
Norinaga placed absolute value on this human inner 
sphere as “nature.” However, this emphasis on human 
sentiments as natural led to his total indifference to 
political participation and then passive obedience to the 
status quo. From Norinaga’s standpoint, we cannot 
claim that we ought to return to nature because this 
claim itself  is normative. 
Thus, the concept of  “invention” represents a 
point of  view that we can and should change the 
existing social system with our own will. On the other 
hand, the concept of  “nature” represents a fatalistic 
point of  view which regards the existing social system 
as a given by the natural order and an unchangeable 
fate. The story which Maruyama tried to tell through 
these concepts was that “modern thinking” based on 
the notion of  “invention” was already born in the 
Tokugawa period but its growth was always hindered 
by pre-modern thinking governed by the laws of  
“nature.”  
2. The “Overcoming Modernity” Debate from the 
Perspective of  Technology 
2.1 The “Overcoming Modernity” Symposium – The 
“Overcoming Modernity” debate has often been 
regarded as an ultra-nationalistic movement. However, 
many researches have shown, especially since the 1980’s, 




that the participants in the “Overcoming Modernity” 
symposium were not mere ultra-nationalists. The 
problem here is not whether they were nationalists, but 
what made them nationalists. 
Let me explain the fundamentals of  the 
“Overcoming Modernity” symposium. As I said earlier, 
the symposium was held under the auspices of  a 
literary magazine “Bungakukai”21  (Literary World) in 
July 1942, gathering thirteen Japanese intellectuals:  
Literary critic KAMEI Katsuichirō, KAWAKAMI Tetsutarō, 
KOBAYASHI Hideo, NAKAMURA Mitsuo 
Novelist HAYASHI Fusao 
Philosopher NISHITANI Keiji, SHIMOMURA Toratarō 
Historian SUZUKI Shigetaka 
Theologian YOSHIMITSU Yoshihiko 
Poet MIYOSHI Tatsuji 
Music composer MOROI Saburō 
Movie critic TSUMURA Hideo 
Physicist KIKUCHI Seishi 
The participants did not actually discuss the war. 
For example, they did not talk about how to fight the 
war or how to justify the military activities of  
Imperial Japan. They discussed more about the 
Renaissance, modern science, their own experience  
 
 
21 This magazine is still running and one of the five most authoritative literary 
magazines in Japan. Kobayashi Hideo and Hayashi Fusao, who are also the 
participants in the debate, were the central figures who launched the magazine. 
Kawakami was a chief editor between 1936 and 1943. Kamei was a frequent 
contributor to it.  




of  modernity, music, movies, etc. Therefore, at least 
superficially, it is difficult to assume that the debate 
was meant to be such a grandiose and stirring 
propaganda for the aggressive war. 
Kawakami, the chairman of  the symposium, said 
that the symposium resulted in “chaos” and 
“breakdown” because, in this sense, the participants 
failed to justify the war. Takeuchi Yoshimi, who 
reissued the record of  the symposium in 1979, 
together with his own essay, describes the debate as 
“ideologically empty” and says ironically:  
It seems to me that the biggest legacy of  the 
“Overcoming Modernity” debate lies in the 
fact that it failed to establish an ideology for 
the war and fascism, and that despite its 
attempt at the formation of  an ideology; it 
actually ended with the loss of  ideology.22  
This “chaos” and “breakdown” resulted from the 
opposition between the Japan Roman School (Nihon 
Rōman Ha) and the Kyoto School (Kyōto Gakuha).  
Takeuchi classified some of  the participants into 
three groups based on their ideological tendency: the 
Japan Roman School, the Kyoto School, and the 
“Bungakukai” group.  
 
 
22 Kawakami, Kindai no chōkoku, 288. 




According to Takeuchi, Kamei belongs to the 
Japan Roman School, but the true representative of  
this school is YASUDA Yojūrō, who was scheduled 
to attend the symposium but could not for personal 
reasons. Nishitani and Suzuki belong to the Kyoto 
school. Kawakami, Nakamura and Shimomura 
belong to the “Bungakukai” group. Kobayashi is 
nothing more than a nominal member of  the 
“Bungakukai” group because his standpoint was 
much closer to that of  the Japan Roman School, at 
least at that time. However, the criterion of  this 
classification is unclear. Takeuchi did not even 
explain what ideological trait each group has. For 
example, what he called the “Bungakukai” group 
played almost no role in the debate. Kawakami did not 
actively join the debate because he was the chairman. 
Nakamura remained almost silent throughout the 
symposium and Shimomura was, in fact, a Kyoto 
School philosopher. Therefore, we can think that in 
essence the debate was fought between the Japan 
Roman School and the Kyoto School.  
To put it briefly, while the Kyoto School 
philosophers aimed at a construction of  a theory to 
overcome modernity, the Japan Roman School 
literary critics refused to recognize theoretical 
constructions, considering them as manifestations of  
a modern way of  thinking. The Kyoto School 




philosophers attempted to devise a new world-
historical principle as an alternative to the Euro-
centered notion of  modern world history. In this 
sense, the summary that Maruyama gave as the 
common perspective of  the “Overcoming Modernity” 
debate is in fact that of  the Kyoto School:  
The common perspective of  these “We shall 
overcome” theorists was that a great turning 
point in world history had been reached; the 
whole world of  modernity which had been 
created by the “advanced nations” collapsing 
loudly about their ears. A completely new 
civilization was about to be born.23 
On the other hand, the Japan Roman School 
refused such an “inventive” enterprise because it is 
nothing more than variations of  modern Western 
ways of  thinking. Hiromatsu Wataru, the most 
brilliant Marxist philosopher in post-war Japan, 
argues that “for them, presenting a new theory, 
practically seeking a new way of  social organization,  
etc., such an attitude should be overcome precisely 
because it still remains in the framework of  the 
modern Western way of  thinking.”24 As I will discuss 
 
23 Maruyama Masao, Studies, xxx. 
24  Hiromatsu Wataru, “Kindai no Chōkoku” ron [On the “Overcoming 
Modernity”] (Tokyo: Kōdansha,1989), 200. 




later, Karatani Kōjin calls this attitude of  the literary 
critics “aesthetics.” 
2.2 Technology in Kyoto School – The “Overcoming 
Modernity” symposium has always been linked to 
another set of  symposia in the 1940’s: “The 
Standpoint of  World History and Japan” (Sekaishiteki 
Tachiba to Nippon, hereafter SWHJ). In addition to 
Nishitani and Suzuki, who also participated in the 
“Overcoming Modernity” symposium, Kōsaka Masaaki 
and Kōyama Iwao took part in the SWHJ symposium. 
They are all Kyoto School philosophers; although, to 
be exact, Suzuki is a historian greatly influenced by 
the Kyoto school of  philosophy.  
The purpose of  the symposium was to criticize 
the ideologies that supported the Western-centered 
picture of  world history and to discuss a totally new 
civilizational principle that allows Japan to engage in 
the making of  world history. In other words, they 
attempted to understand Japan as an embodiment of  
Weltgeist in a Hegelian sense. In their understanding, 
the Western met the Eastern in Japan for the first  
time in world history, and therefore Japan is a place 
in which the Western and the Eastern contradict each 
other. This contradiction must be “sublated” into a 
new unification. They thought that only Japan, as the 
place of  contradiction, could give such a new 
unifying principle of  world history. 




In the SWHJ discussion, they take the problem of  
machine civilization as one of  the crises to be 
overcome. For example, Suzuki says: 
After all, the problem is that, while science 
will continue to make progress, there will 
continue to be a discrepancy in the 
relationship between the progress of  the 
civilization and the human inner soul. The 
machine civilization pertains to the 
environment outside humans. The civilization 
makes the impossible possible, but still, it is 
nothing but a civilization about the external 
environment and therefore I think it is 
irrelevant to a true human inner soul. This 
dissociation and disharmony between the 
internal and the external is becoming more 
and more intense in our time. We can say a 
spiritual crisis of  our time lies in this.25 
In relation to this point, Kōsaka presents a 
solution. While he admits that the European spirit 
has its own spiritual depth, he argues that such depth 
is not enough to free us from the dissociation 
between the internal and the external. He said: 
 
 
25 Kōsaka Masaaki et al., Sekaishi teki tachiba to nippon [The Standpoint of 
World History and Japan] (Tokyo; Chūō Kōron Sha, 1943), 38. 




This is a very difficult problem, but I think 
we may be able to mediate the depth of  the 
individuals’ soul with the historical depth of  
the nation’s soul. Though this sounds 
paradoxical, we can say a modern total war is 
the very product of  machine civilization, but 
at the same time, conversely, we can think it 
is an agony in which the national subjectivity 
tries to put mechanical organizations under 
control. If  we can think in this way, I think 
we may be able to escape from a dissociation 
with machine civilization by discovering the 
substance of  the individuals’ ethical life in 
the historical practice of  the nation.26 
In the “Overcoming Modernity” Symposium, 
Shimomura Toratarō expresses a similar idea in a 
more understandable way:  
The problem here is, needless to say, the 
concept of  soul. One of  the characteristics 
of  the Christian idea is their understanding 
of  soul as the internal. The new soul is 
external only to this sort of  traditional soul. 
An ancient soul is a soul as opposed to its 
body. In the present age, however, a body in  
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this simple sense does not exist in reality. A 
body in the present age is an organism that 
has machines as its organs in some way or 
the other. The tragedy of  modernity lies in 
that outmoded souls failed to catch up with 
this “new body.” This is why we need a new 
metaphysics for this new body and mind. A 
body in the present age became more huge 
and precise. The method of  ancient 
psychology such as inner resolution and 
personal training is not sufficient for this 
new body. It requires sociopolitical, and 
furthermore, national methods. Not only 
that, it also requires even a new theology.27 
It goes without saying that this “new body” means 
machine civilization. Shimomura focuses not on 
machines themselves but the souls that create 
machines. From his viewpoint, machines are not 
irrelevant or external to our souls. Rather, we have  
machines as part of  our body in a broader sense. 
Therefore, the problem is that our obsolete souls 
failed to adapt themselves to such a new body. In 
ancient times, human beings developed various 
methods to control their body. But the more  
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technologically expanded their body, the less effective 
the ancient methods were in taming this body. 
Therefore, we need more expanded “sociopolitical” 
or even “national” methods in order to control it. 
Thus, what the Kyoto School philosophers have in 
common is the idea that the fragmentation between 
the internal and the external, mind and body, soul 
and machine can be solved through the national 
control of  technology. However, at the same time, 
they thought that the principle for this national control 
cannot be found in modern European ideologies. What 
has brought about the fragmentation is nothing other 
than European principles such as liberalism, rationalism 
and capitalism, etc. Of  course, they would not 
completely abandon modern civilization because their 
philosophical confidence came from the conviction 
that Japan is the only place where the West-East 
contradiction is sublated into a totally new unification. 
If  they simply abandoned Western modernity, such a 
dialectical process could not occur. Accordingly, they  
did not attempt to return to Japanese ancient 
tradition in its purest form, but to establish, so to 
speak, a “Japanese” modernity as a synthesis of  East 
and West. 
2.3 The “Aesthetics” of  the Japan Roman School – On the other 
hand, the Japan Roman School and its followers have 
a strong tendency to refuse any act of  theorizing as a 




manifestation of  modern Western attitudes. This is 
why Hiromatsu regarded their discourses as 
“theoretical chaos”28  and placed more value on the 
Kyoto School than on the Japan Roman School. 
Recently his preference for the Kyoto School has been 
criticized. For example, Sugawara Jun insists that the 
philosophical importance of  the Japan Roman School 
deserves more attention. 29  However, Hiromatsu did 
not completely dismiss the significance of  the Japan 
Roman School in the debate. He properly noticed the 
fanatic emotion or passion behind its discourses: or 
more precisely, a sense of  resignation and despair and 
warped spiritual awakening, which resulted in the 
refusal of  any theorizing.  
Yasuda Yojūrō, a central figure of  the Japan 
Roman School, insisted that contemporary Japanese 
literature was caught in the logic of  bureaucrats. 
According to him, it was nothing but “the logic of  
the civilization and enlightenment” (bunmeikaika no 
ronri).30  The Japanese government during the Meiji 
period imposed Western civilization on the people. 
He called this from-above character “the logic      
 
 
28 Hiromatsu, “Kindai no Chōkoku” ron, 201. 
29 See Sugawara Jun, “Kindai no Chōkoku” Saikō [The “Overcoming Modernity” 
Revisited] (Kyoto: Kōyō Shobō, 2011). 
30 See Yasuda Yojūrō, Yasuda Yojūrō Bunko 7: Bungaku no Tachiba [Yasuda 
Yojūrō Library 7: The Standpoint of Literature] (Kyoto: Shingakusha, 1999), 7-18. 




of  civilization and enlightenment.” As an ex-
Marxist he thought that Marxism also has the same 
from-above character, as seen in the fact that the 
Communist Party had controlled the proletarian 
literature movement. Thus, he thoroughly refused any 
bureaucratic from-above control. However, his extreme 
position led him to a sort of  aesthetic attitude towards 
death. He saw the supreme strength and beauty of  
human souls in the act of  self-sacrifice for the sake 
of  one’s own country, neither for earthly interests 
nor due to coercion.  
This desperate attitude is also seen in Kamei 
Katsuichirō. He had recognized that “we are the ones 
being conquered by machines rather than the other 
way around.” Furthermore, it should be noted that 
he often uses the expression of  “natural compulsive  
force” (shizenteki no kyōseiryoku) in order to 
characterize the modern machine civilization. He 
wrote in the essay that he submitted for the 
“Overcoming Modernity” symposium: 
The heavy pressure of  civilization which 
weighed on us with an almost natural 
compulsive force, machinism, all its diseases 
and the breakdown which it has caused, the 
self-destruction of  immoderate human 
beings, whether we shall perish or there is  
 




still some salvation, these are the wars 
hidden behind the World War this time.31 
His dystopian view of  the world results from an 
image of  “nature.” Machines that we “invented” 
become the second “nature” and attacked us with the 
furious rage of  nature. We cannot escape this 
dialectical structure of  reality, whatever material 
things we may invent. In this reality, only the 
aesthetics of  death substantiates the sublimity of  
human souls. Therefore, hinting his antipathy to a 
national educational policy, he also says: 
It is only natural that it has been thought 
that the spirit of  the classics in our country 
is the best remedy against the poison of  
civilization. However, what is important is 
how to use the remedy…Once you think 
you might be saved, even get a little closer to 
the Gods, Buddha, or the great sages of  old, 
you will begin to become depraved. For the 
divine sutras and the ancient classics do not 
exist for our relief  but for our restless 
struggles. They are the products of  the 
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teaching by pushing us away into the infinite  
hell...They teach that only self-sacrifice can 
prove what our future will be.32 
By “the poison of  civilization” he means the 
harmful effects of  modern machine civilization on 
human spirits. After all, for him, the aesthetics of  
self-sacrifice is the only way to release human spirits 
from the vicious circle of  human alienation.  
Karatani Kōjin 33  argues that one of  the 
characteristics of  the “Overcoming Modernity” 
debate is the indifference to the problem of  
technology. According to Karatani, this attitude 
comes from the “aesthetic” attitude of  the 
participants. From the standpoint of  aesthetics,  
beauty should be explored through the rejection of  
actual interests in the real world. Therefore, their 
aesthetic attitude results in a sort of  apolitical attitude. 
Accordingly, they are basically indifferent to the 
problem of  modern technology that is filled with too 
many interests in the real world. For them, the beauty 
of  human spirits should be foreign to a technology 




32 Ibid., 16 
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The “Overcoming Modernity” debate is closely 
connected with the problem of  technology and 
human alienation. The Kyoto School philosophers 
attempted to establish a new principle that can 
overcome the problem of  human alienation through 
the national control of  technology. At the same time, 
however, they equated modernity with the West and 
therefore had to “overcome” modern principles such 
as liberalism, rationalism, capitalism, and others. 
Because they thought that Japan was the place where 
the West-East contradiction will be sublated into a 
new unification, they tried to establish “Japanese” 
modernity as a synthesis of  West and East.  
Such synthesis in a universal guise was in fact 
nationalistic and imperialistic. Nevertheless, they 
thought that the national control of  technology 
should be based on it. On the other hand, the Japan 
Roman School subscribed to an aesthetic of  self-
sacrifice. This aesthetic attitude comes from a sense 
of  resignation, despair, and a warped self-awakening. 
What was behind this desperation is also the problem 
of  human alienation, that is, machines which humans 
have created inversely control them. They felt that 
there is no escaping this vicious circle. Accordingly, 
for them, the only hope is that humans show the 
sublimity of  their spirits through the act of  self-
sacrifice. 




3. Maruyama’s Reaction to the “Overcoming Modernity” 
Debate 
3.1 The Possibility – If  we take into consideration the 
technological aspect of  the “Overcoming Modernity” 
debate, what problem and possibility does Maruyama’s 
defense of  modernity have? The problem is clear: 
basically he overlooked the problem of  technology that 
the “Overcoming Modernity” advocates had to face in 
the real world.  
Maruyama, however, did not completely ignore the 
problem of  technology. Though his point of  view in 
technology was not developed enough, he writes in 
one of  his diaries: 
In what sense am I, or do I want to be, a 
socialist? First, it is because I am against 
nationalism―any trends in which a nation 
absorbs societies and the individuals. Socialism 
is essentially international and it should be a 
principle that is not limited to the so-called 
socialist states. It is the principle for a 
cosmopolitan rather than international 
solidarity.  
Second, the swelling of  modern technologies 
and organizations as well as the complication 
of  social interrelationships can no longer be 
dealt with by bourgeois individualism. 




Planned production and distribution are 
indispensable in order to keep the 
socialization of  production to the principle 
of  irresponsible or fundamental pursuit of  
profits. While bourgeois individualism is 
responsible to the formal organizational 
evil of  a nation (or bureaucrats), it is 
insensitive to the organizational evil that 
grows in a society. Modern huge industries 
are clearly totalitarian and based on a leader-
centered principle. While it is authoritative as 
an organization, it demands irresponsible 
freedom from the consumerist members of  
other societies.  
However, the second point subordinates 
the  first. Therefore, from this standpoint, 
“national-socialism” is more dangerous than 
individualism. Socialism must be “individual-
socialism.” Planning should only be approved 
if  it serves the dignity of  each individual.34 
Muruyama was sometimes criticized for his 
sympathetic attitude toward socialism and communism. 
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the above-mentioned questions. It is not that actually 
he was, or wanted to be, a so-called socialist.  
Maruyama’s viewpoint here, is in a sense, similar 
to that of  the Kyoto School philosophers because 
both insist on the control of  modern technologies 
and industries in some way or the other. As I have 
argued, the Kyoto School philosophers insisted that 
technology should be put under national control. In 
this light, their standpoint is partly similar to 
socialism or communism. This is because the Kyoto 
School philosophers, left or right, have come to be 
influenced by Marxism since the latter half  of  the 
1920’s. In fact, Nishida Kitarō, the founder of  the 
Kyoto School, produced not only nationalistic 
philosophers but also many talented Marxist 
philosophers such as Tosaka Jun. This is how even 
the right-wing Kyoto School philosophers could not 
ignore Marxism. Instead, the rightists regarded it as 
the ultimate form of  Western modernity and  
attempted to establish a totally new unification by 
overcoming Marxism. However, because the true 
nature of  this new unification is nothing more than 
an ultra-nationalistic and totalitarian one, their 
attempt ended with an ideological justification for 
Japan’s total war. 
 
 




The difference is that Maruyama tried to base the 
control of  technologies on what he called 
“individual-socialism.” Since he does not clearly 
define the term as “bourgeois individualism” and 
“individual-socialism”, it is not certain what he was 
trying to say here. Nevertheless, we can surmise that he 
tried to think about the democratic control of  
technological activities. As I quoted earlier, Shimomura 
Toratarō insisted on the need for a totally new 
sociopolitical method to domesticate machines as our 
new expanded body. Shimomura and the other Kyoto 
School philosophers thought that this new 
sociopolitical method should become national in 
scale. However, Maruyama clearly opposes this 
direction. For him, such a new sociopolitical method 
should be based on individualism, not on nationalism. 
It may be a little strange that he criticized 
“bourgeois individualism” and in the next breath, 
proposed “individual-socialism.” The problem is 
what the modifier “bourgeois” implies. We may be 
able to interpret it in relation to the standpoint of  
Norinaga and the Japan Roman School. According to 
Maruyama, Norinaga took advantage of  the 
separation between the public and the private that 
Sorai’s idea of  invention brought about. This public-
private dichotomy is itself  a prerequisite for modern 
individualism. But Norinaga put an overemphasis on 




private inner sentiments because he regarded such 
inner sentiments as truly “natural.” From his 
standpoint, any social norm that humans “invented” 
is unnatural and any activities related to the 
“invention” of  social institutions is also unnatural. 
Thus, he refused any “invention” and withdrew from 
the public sphere into the private sphere. This 
attitude is almost similar to that of  the Japan Roman 
School and its followers.  
The Japan Roman School literary critics had a 
strong tendency to refuse any theorizing because 
such an active attitude is itself  nothing more than a 
manifestation of  the modern way of  thinking. In the 
vocabulary of  Maruyama, we can say that they 
refused any modern “invention” and withdrew into 
the aesthetics of  “nature.” Thus, we can conclude 
that for Maruyama this was the very consequence of  
“bourgeois” individualism.  
If  this is the case, we can say that what he called 
“individualism” without the modifier “bourgeois” 
means a democratic viewpoint that each individual 
actively engages in “invention” of  social systems. He 
tries to expand this viewpoint even to technological 
activities. Though I am hesitant to conclude this, 
Maruyama’s viewpoint here is clearly similar to the 
standpoint of  the democratic rationalization of  




technology that Andrew Feenberg has proposed.35 In 
this point we can see the possibility of  Maruyama’s 
modernist idea to the problem of  modern 
technologies. 
3.2 The Problem – Nevertheless, there is a clear limitation 
to Maruyama’s standpoint: after all, he did not try to 
argue about the problem of  technology as a main 
theme. Of  course, this is partly due to his specialty. 
His focus as a researcher was on the intellectual 
history of  Japan. Therefore, if  we harshly criticize 
him too much for his relative indifference to the 
problem of  technology, it would be like “crying for 
the moon,” a longing for the impossible. However, 
there is another reason for his belittlement of  
technology: his reduction of  modernity to “modern 
thinking.” 
Koyasu Nobukuni points out a problem in 
Maruyama’s reaction to the “Overcoming Modernity”  
debate in relation to his idealization of  modernity. 
According to Koyasu, there is a sharp contrast 
between Maruyama and Horkheimer as well as 
Adorno. To put it plainly, while Horkheimer and 
Adorno criticized modernity itself  in order to resist  
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fascism, Maruyama defended modernity and accused 
the immaturity of  modernity in Japan. Based on this 
line of  thought, Koyasu recognizes that Maruyama 
sees the origin of  the error and the traps of  
modernism. Maruyama’s modernist discourse had 
been formed as a counter-argument to the fascistic 
tendencies of  the advocates of  “Overcoming 
Modernity”. Accordingly, in order to cope with the 
debate, Maruyama had to idealize modernity. As a 
result, his modernism could not respond to the actual 
problems of  modernity which the “Overcoming 
Modernity” advocates astutely pointed out. Koyasu 
argues: 
It is through the replacement of  the 
question of  “modernity” with the question 
of  whether “modern thinking” is mature or 
immature that the “modernistic” discourse 
has been constituted. In the discourse, 
however, the notion of  “modernity” in the 
so called “modern world order” was not 
questioned. The “modernism” does not have  
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He does not explain thoroughly what he actually 
means by “modern world order.” It seems to me that 
he means the world order that the modern European 
states have established based on the ideology of  the 
nation-state, but it is not important here. What is 
important is that the idealization of  modernity may 
have led Maruyama to dismiss the type of  modernity 
that exists in reality.  
Mindful of  Maruyama’s intellectual position, Julia 
Adeney Thomas argues that “[w]hile Japan was not 
a liberal modernity, a democratic modernity (except 
in the most limited formal sense of  universal male 
suffrage by 1925), or, by any means, a leftist 
modernity, it achieved modernity nonetheless.”37 
According to her, what is behind the conception of  
modernity is the concept of  “Nature” in the singular. 
She invoked the “Dialectic of  Enlightenment” as 
Koyasu did. 
While pointing out the stark contrast between 
Maruyama’s position on the one hand, and  
Horkheimer and Adorno on the other hand, she also 
pointed out a fundamental similarity between them in 
that they regarded modernity as transcending nature.  
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In addition, she argues that “most modern left and 
liberal theorists, especially in the early and mid-
twentieth century, were highly skeptical of  any 
reliance on nature in political thought.”38 However, as 
her detailed research demonstrates, even in Japan the 
ideas concerning nature are too diverse. They should 
not be conflated together as a singular theory of  
nature. Therefore, she proposes to give up thinking 
of  modernity as a monolithic and universal 
phenomenon. Instead, modernity should be 
understood in its plurality: “Reconfiguring multiple 
concepts of  nature, as I came to realize, meant 
recognizing multiple forms of  modernity.”39 
The criticism of  Koyasu and Thomas suggests 
that Maruyama, because of  his idealization of  
modernity, overlooked modernity as a “historical 
experience.” Thomas says:  
“[w]hat unites different forms of  modernity 
around the globe is the shared experience of  
the dissolution of  the old “cosmopolis”, the  
fundamental relationship between nature 
and society, followed by its conscious 
reconstruction in a different pattern.”40  
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In the “Overcoming Modernity” debate, there was 
a sense of  the “dissolution of  the old ‘cosmopolis.’” 
Then, what brought about such dissolution? Koyasu 
would say it was the Euro-centered world order 
based on the ideology of  the nation-state. I did not 
take this direction.  
I focused on the problem of  modern technology 
and human alienation as a historical experience of  
the dissolution. In order to point out the pre-modern 
character of  pre-war Japan, Maruyama said 
sarcastically: 
“vide the fact that the technological capacity 
to produce first-class battleships coexisted 
with, was mutually supportive with, the 
national myth, the pre-twentieth myth, that 
Japan’s rulers had been designated in 
perpetuity by edict of  Sun-Goddess 
Amaterasu.”41 
We can say that Maruyama criticized the “pre-
twentieth myth” by “replacing the question of  
‘modernity’ with the question of  whether ‘modern  
thinking’ is mature or immature.” On the other hand, 
however, he left almost untouched the problem of   
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modernity as “the technological capacity to produce 
first-class battleships.” 
Conclusion 
In this paper, I showed that Maruyama basically 
overlooked the technological aspect of  the “Overcoming 
Modernity” debate because he reduced the problem of  
modernity to that of  “modern thinking.” Behind this 
reduction were various political issues such as Japan’s war 
and the anti-Anpo movement 42  in the 1960’s. In such 
situations, political democratization was the most urgent 
task.  
On the other hand, however, when we give a thought to 
the Fukushima nuclear incident, we cannot help but feel that 
the problem of  the democratic control of  technologies has 
been left almost untouched behind various conspicuous 
political issues. Upon reflection, the concept of  “invention” 
is more fitting for technological activities. In this sense,  
Maruyama is using this concept through a metaphorical 
projection from the technical realm to the political realm. 
Nevertheless, he limited its coverage within the political 
 
42 Anpo is a shortened form in Japanese language for Treaty of Mutual 
Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan. There was a fierce 
campaign against the conclusion of this treaty in the 1960’s. Maruyama played an 
important role in this campaign as an opinion leader. The ruling party (Liberal 
Democratic Party) rammed the legal approval of this treaty through a forced 
passage of a bill, physically removing sit-down Socialists. Because many Japanese 
people thought that this was the destruction of democracy, this movement became 
more and more intensified.  




realm and understood “invention” almost only as a sort of  
mental attitude, or modern “thinking.” This is one of  the 
reasons that he did not seriously take up the problem of  
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